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ABSTRACT 
The Navy Warfare Development Command has taken the lead in studying needed 
Capabilities for the Navy After Next. Amongst the ideas they are considering are 
innovative special purpose littoral warEire pla~orms as well as alternative relationships 
between platforms, sensors, weapons, and information. This thesis presents a low- 
resolution model for analysis of Navy After Next concepts and demonstrates the potential 
use of the model. Presented is an adaptation of the existing Hughes Salvo Model which 
had been W e d  to analysis of engagements between forces composed of identical units, 
i.e., homogeneous forces. This heterogeneous extension is an analytical device that 
captures the unique combat characteristics of individual units. The model helps decision 
makers understand salvo warfare of heterogeneous forces by simplirjring the complex 
relationships within and between forces during battle. Using a previous work that tested 
Hughes’ model, the accuracy of this heterogeneous salvo model is examined by 
comparing results. This thesis further demonstrates the strength of the heterogeneous 
salvo model through an analysis of a hypothetical campaign scenario and through an 
examination of alternative tactics. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), in coordination with the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), is studying efforts to identify 
needed Capabilities for the Navy After Next (CNAN). The CNAN project examines 
those leading technologies, capabilities, and doctrine that will best contribute to the 
United States Navy twenty years in the future. CNAN is unique from other future 
planning organizations in that the foundations of its work are not limited to the current 
feasibility of the ideas. Instead of designing the Navy after Next using current trends, 
CNAN attempts to step “outside the box” and examine these ideas and the steps 
necessary to achieve those goals. 
Joint Vision 2020 [Ref.l] and Forward ... From the Sea, The Navy Operational 
Concept rRef.21 provide Navy leaders with insight into how future military threats will 
manifest themselves and how US. military forces will work together to fight against 
these threats. Joint Vision 2020 also stresses the importance of our ability to recognize 
emerging technologies and successfully incorporate them into the military organization. 
The ultimate goal is to increase the capabilities of U.S. forces. Failure to do so, coupled 
with the enemy successes, increases the chance of failure in future conflicts. 
One future capability under examination defines an alternative relationship 
between platforms, sensors, weapons, and information that enables a “powerful, fast 
striking geographically dispersed force that exploits information superiority to rapidly 
overwhelm its adversaries [Ref. 31.” The result is network-centric operations (NCO), an 
innovative concept that shifts operational focus from individual nodes, or platforms, to a 
network of nodes. NCO allows a force to synchronously distribute its assets throughout a 
battle space while constantly adapting to changes in its environment. 
A second possibility for CNAN is the Streetfighter concept. The Streetfighter 
characteristics are only loosely defined but generally thought of as small, high-speed, 
affordable, and perhaps expendable surface combatants [Ref. 41. It is evident that 
Streetfighter and NCO are complementary features of a CNAN force. For motivation and 
1 
in an analysis example, this thesis will use a generalized version of a future CNAN 
design coupling NCO and Streetfighters. To assist in analysis, the thesis uses 
mathematical terminology to describe the CNAN force in its most general form. The 
Navy After Next will consist of a network of platforms, sensors, and weapons, integrated 
in a way to provide military decision makers with superior battlespace awareness. Each 
network node represents a military unit, whether a platform, sensor, or weapon, with 
some characteristic parameters for offensive and defensive capabilities. The arcs 
between nodes represent the multi-dimensional links between units. These arcs may 
represent communication links, data transfer, or some other means of synchronous 
linkage. Figure 1 shows a three-dimensional network representation of the different 
components that might make up the CNAN force. Each different shade represents a unit 
function, such as a sensor, weapon, or platform, and within each shaded group there are 
multiple instances of that unit. For example, Figure 1 can represent a CNAN force of 
four black surface ships, five gray radar systems, and six white weapon systems linked 
together. The arcs between units may be a type of super-high frequency or line-of-sight 
radio frequency, while the inter-unit arcs can be satellite 
advanced data links. The reader should not infer that 
independent sub-networks. Rather, as Figure 2 depicts, all 
network. 
communications or future 
the functional layers are 
nodes are members of one 
Figure 1. Network Components for the CNAN Force 
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Figure 2. A Two-Dimensional View of a CNAN Force 
The greatest advantage that a network-centric force provides is its ability to 
generate accurate and timely battlespace information while simultaneously disseminating 
that information throughout the force. This increase in accurate information, in turn, may 
empower the force as never before by providing a more complete assessment of both 
friendly and enemy operations. There is also expected to be the additional benefit of a 
decrease in response time for time-sensitive evolutions such as over-the-horizon targeting 
in force-on-force engagements. 
A sports example to understand CNAN forces is that of a good soccer team. The 
team is composed of eleven individual players each of whom have particular capabilities 
(strength, endurance, coordination, and dexterity). The team is organized into four semi- 
overlapping layers: a goalie, defenders, forwards, and mid-fields. During play, each has a 
set of unique responsibilities, but they also have general overall responsibilities. Each of 
the layers function independently of others, that is, the forwards work together, as do the 
mid-fielders. The individual players in each layer can also function independently of 
each other. However, the team functions as a cohesive organization. All players are 
aware of their surroundings and the overall picture of the game and are capable of 
instantaneously reacting to dynamic changes on the playing field. In soccer, each player 
can see all 22 players and the ball. Each is capable of coordinating his actions. In 
combat the network is needed so that all players can “see the playing field” and 
coordinate their actions. 
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B. PROBLEM 
If the Navy After Next is a force that is founded upon the principles of Network 
Centricity, then the U.S. Navy needs to pursue innovative methods to coordinate, operate 
and sustain joint forces in the future. These innovations must include the research and 
development of weapon systems that are themselves capable of operating in and 
contributing to a networked system. Decision makers, at all levels, will be challenged by 
the paradigm shift-operating as discrete systems functioning as one network. Similarly, 
analysts will require the capability to examine problems and provide useful and insightful 
analysis to the decision makers. They will need an analysis methodology that is 
responsive enough to keep up with the underlying warfare innovations. 
1. 
Although simulation is a very powerful and useful tool for solving some 
problems, it is not always the most appropriate method for others. Elaborate combat 
simulations, which rely upon high fidelity modeling, may not be responsive to rapidly 
changing technological advances in weapons systems and warfare concepts. The Navy 
After Next requires a simple model that is capable of capturing the innate properties of 
different weapon systems and allowing decision makers to understand the relationship 
and interaction between forces and pursue alternatives. If we can capture and model the 
essential characteristics of these weapon systems, we may be capable of providing easy, 
but limited, analysis. 
Alternative to Complex Simulation for Exploratory Analysis 
The Hughes Salvo Model [Ref. 51 is such a model. It gives the analyst a simple 
method in which to evaluate the effects of salvo warfare between two opposing forces 
and allows simple insight into the broad characteristics of the battle. The model 
calculates the fraction of ships, or a force of identical ships, put out of action as a result of 
successful hits from an opposing ship or force. 
2. 
The words homogeneous and heterogeneous come from the Greek words 
homogengs and heterogen& which mean same kind and other kind [Ref. 61. 
Homogeneous forces are those forces composed of the same kind of notional combat 
unit. Each unit displays the same combat characteristics, such as the rate of fire, rate of 
Modeling Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Forces 
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defense, reconnaissance capability, survivability, etc. In contrast, a heterogeneous force 
is composed of “other kinds” of units, that is, combat units with different characteristics. 
A homogeneous force is a subset, or special case, of heterogeneous forces. A modeling 
technique to transform heterogeneous forces into homogeneous forces is to calculate the 
force average value for every parameter and assign those value to each unit. A second 
technique is to calculate the weighted sum of a parameter for each unit in the force and 
use that value for a force size of one. These techniques often yield acceptable 
approximations but have limited applicability. 
The Hughes model uses a ship’s offensive and defensive characteristics as 
parameters in order to express the effects of salvo warfare against an opposing ship. The 
model is scalable, allowing salvo warfare modeling between opposing forces of identical, 
i.e. homogeneous, ships. However, to capture the heterogeneous nature of the Navy 
After Next and to exploit the differences between various units in order to see how they 
interact with each other in a cooperative network, the assumptions of the Hughes Salvo 
Model can be too limiting. By developing a heterogeneous extension to the salvo model, 
this thesis offers a refinement that will enable the basic salvo model approach to be 
applied to future naval combat. 
C. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to present a low-resolution model for the Navy After 
Next and demonstrates its potential use as a combat model for decision makers. Chapter 
11, reviews the Hughes Salvo Model and discusses its limitations with heterogeneous 
forces. It also introduces a heterogeneous extension of the Hughes Salvo Model and 
demonstrates its use. Chapter I11 examines the accuracy of the heterogeneous extension 
using a previous work, which used historical data to test the Hughes Salvo Model. 
Chapter IV examines a hypothetical campaign scenario and demonstrates how the 
heterogeneous salvo model can be used to aid in operational decision-making. Chapter 
V provides the readers with final thoughts and recommendations for future work. 
5 
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11. SALVO MODEL 
This chapter reviews the Hughes Salvo Model and discusses its limitations with 
heterogeneous forces. It then introduces a heterogeneous extension of the Hughes Salvo 
Model and demonstrates its use. Presented are terms, used by both models, that are 
essential for the reader’s understanding of the use of the specific model. This chapter 
argues the need for a flexible combat model, which is capable of exploiting the 
differences between the ships, or units, that compose a force. This chapter discusses the 
limitations of the homogeneous salvo model to fulfill this need and presents the 
heterogeneous salvo model as a suitable model for simple analysis of salvo warfare for 
the Navy After Next. 
A. HUGHES SALVO MODEL 
The Hughes salvo model is a simple mathematical methodology that captures the 
essential elements of salvo warfare for analysis. It is also a means “with which to 
compare the military worth of warship capabilities.” [Ref. 51 The model provides a 
descriptive method of exploring the relationships between offensive, defensive, and 
staying power, and the number of units with those of an opposing force. 
At the heart of the model is the salvo equation, which calculates the fraction of 
ships in a force that are placed out of action as a result of successful hits from an 
opposing force. In its simplest form, the salvo equation yields the fraction of hits all 
ships receive divided by the number of hits necessary to place a ship out of action. The 




A group of naval ships that operate and fight together. 
b) Unit 
A unit is an individual ship in a force. 
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c)  Salvo 
A salvo is the number of shots fired as a unit of force in a discrete period 
of time. 
d)  Combat Potential 
Combat Potential is a force’s total stored offensive capability of an 
element or force measured in number of total shots available. 
e) Combat Power 
Also called Striking Power, is the maximum offensive capability of an 
element or force per salvo, measured in the number of hitting shots that would be 
achieved in the absence of degrading factors. 
fl Scouting Effectiveness 
Scouting Effectiveness is a dimensionless degradation factor applied to a 
force’s combat power as a result of imperfect information. It is a number between zero 
and one that describes the difference between the shots delivered based on perfect 
knowledge of enemy composition and position and shots based on existing information 
[Ref. 71. 
g )  Training Effectiveness 
Training effectiveness is a fraction that indicates the degradation in 
combat power due the lack of training, motivation, or readiness. 
h) Distraction Factor 
Also called chaff effectiveness or seduction, is a multiplier that describes 
the effectiveness of an offensive weapon in the presence of distraction or other soft kill. 
This multiplier is a fraction, where one indicates no susceptibilitykomplete effectiveness 
and zero indicates complete susceptibilityho effectiveness. 
i )  Offensive Effectiveness 
Offensive effectiveness is a composite term made of the product of 
scouting effectiveness, training effectiveness, distraction, or any other factor which 
represents the probability of a single salvo hitting its target. Offensive effectiveness 
transforms a unit’s combat potential parameter into combat power. 
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j )  Defensive Potential 
Defensive potential is a force's total defensive capability measured in 
units of enemy hits eliminated independent of weapon system or operator accuracy or any 
other multiplicative factor. 
k) Defensive Power 
Defensive power is the number of missiles in an enemy salvo that a 
defending element or force can eliminate. 
1) Defender Alertness 
Defender alertness is the extent to which a defender fails to take proper 
defensive actions against enemy fire. This may be the result of any inattentiveness due to 
improper emission control procedures, readiness, or other similar factors [Ref. 71. This 
multiplier is a fraction, where one indicates complete alertness and zero indicates no 
alertness. 
m) Defensive Effectiveness 
Defensive effectiveness is a composite term made of the product of 
training effectiveness and defender alertness. This term also applies to any value that 
represents the overall degradation of a force's defensive power. 
n) Staying Power 
Staying power is the number of hits that a unit or force can absorb before 
being placed out of action. 
2. Homogeneous Salvo Model 
The two equations that make up the Homogeneous Salvo Model are: 
.P'B - a;A CX'A -b;B AA= andAE3= where, 
P' = ( ~ B T B P A  >P 
a' = ( O A ~ A P B  >a 
a1 b, 
a; = ('AT* 1.3 
b; = ('BTB>b3 
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A = number of units in force A. 
B = number of units in force B. 
a = the number of well-aimed missiles fired by each A unit per salvo. 
a3 = number of well-aimed attacking missiles eliminated by each A unit per salvo. 
b3 = number of well-aimed attacking missiles eliminated by each B unit per salvo. 
a1 = number of missiles required to place an A unit out of action. 
bl = number of missiles required to place a B unit out of action. 
CTA = Scouting effectiveness of force A. 
CTB = Scouting effectiveness of force B. 
6~ = Defender alertness for force A. 
6 B  = Defender alertness for force B. 
ZA = Training effectiveness for force A. 
ZB = Training effectiveness for force B. 
PA = Distraction factor for force A. 
PB = Distraction factor for force B. 
AA = number of A units put out of action from B’s salvo. 
AJ3 = number of B units put out of action from A’s salvo. 
= number of well-aimed missiles fired by each B unit per salvo. 
The model assumes that offensive salvos are distributed uniformly across all of 
the defender’s ships. Although a more descriptive distribution can be used, Hughes 
argues that in the past, when targets were in sight of each other, optimality of fire was 
never achieved and therefore the assumption of uniformity is sufficient for analysis [Ref. 
51. The model also assumes that a force’s defense is perfect until it reaches its saturation 
point at which time it can no longer defend against additional salvos. A third assumption 
is that offensive combat power and defensive power are linear under damage, e.g., a ship 
with staying power of two hits that is hit by a single salvo has its offensive and defensive 
power reduce by one half. 
B. HETEROGENEOUS SALVO MODEL 
The CNAN project envisions a networked force, whose total combat and 
defensive power are widely distributed, as more advantageous than a force with combat 
and defensive power concentrated in only a few hulls. It envisions the Navy after Next as 
a mobile network of platforms, sensors, and weapons. Each node in this heterogeneous 
network represents one or more pieces of a weapon system, whether a platform, sensor, 
or weapon, and the network arcs are the links between nodes. Each node has its own 
characteristic parameters for offensive, defensive, and staying power. Each node may or 
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may not have some parameter that describes its scouting characteristics or some other 
types of combat multipliers. There may also be characteristic parameters that indicate the 
connectivity of a node and the quality of the arc. A node with no connection contributes 
nothing to the total force, while a node with only degraded arcs contributes a fraction of 
its capabilities. The optimality of arc configuration and the information provided is a 
topic for future analysis. 
Historically, naval forces were typically divided into three categories of ships 
based upon the perceived mission. First was the battle fleet, whose prime responsibility 
was to destroy the enemy fleet. Second was the cruiser fleet, which raided enemy 
commerce and protected friendly commerce. Third was the flotilla of small craft, which 
fought in the littorals. [Ref. 81 There is not an easy one-for-one comparison with modern 
naval forces. A variety of ship types and classes have the capability to function across a 
number of mission areas. For example, large decked ships carry the individual fighting 
entities (aircraft, marines, special force, etc) that fight both enemy naval and ground 
forces. Aegis cruisers and destroyers have a dual role in the modern naval force by both 
engaging enemy fleets and protecting friendly warships. Fast patrol craft and special 
operations ships not only protect the littorals, but are also capable of engaging the 
enemy’s battle force. 
There are a few instances in modern naval combat where a portion of the battle 
force comprised of smaller units. During World War 11, for example, the United States 
used PT boats in both theaters of war. The combat environment of the time necessitated 
an alternate approach to the traditional modes of naval warfare. In these smaller forces, 
the assets were capable of delivering powerful ordnance to high-valued enemy targets 
without subjecting capital ships to direct harm. 
The complex and powerful warships of the current generation possess the most 
advanced technological devices and are capable of completing a variety of missions. 
Currently, United States naval ships have the ability to deliver an unmatched quantity of 
combat .power to a wide variety of targets while simultaneously applying a large amount 
of defensive power against an enemy to counter his combat power. However, analysis 
demonstrates that homogeneous forces, those composed of identical units, display 
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instability when the staying power is small compared to the combat power [Ref. 71. That 
is, if a force’s combat potential is large relative to its survivability, then a few hits may 
result in the catastrophic loss of the entire force and underscores the need for a first, 
unanswered strike against an opposing force. To increase stability, there must be an 
increase in either the force’s numbers or its unit staying power [Ref. 91. 
Therefore, an alternate approach that increases the defensive or staying power is 
to distribute a fraction of the force’s combat power in many individual units so that its 
loss costs only a small fraction of the force’s combat potential. For example, if there are 
five ships, each with the capability to fire five missiles, the then force has a total combat 
power of 25. If one ship is damaged or unable to engage in battle, the force’s combat 
power is reduced to 20. If, however, a fraction of missiles could be distributed to other 
units in the force, then the loss of one ship would only results in the loss of some fraction 
of the five missiles. The remaining missiles are then available for future engagements. 
Increasing the size of the force and distributing the combat and defensive potential in 
many smaller combat units achieve the same effect. In the extreme case 25 ships might 
be employed instead of five, each with the capability to fire one missile. 
1. Assumptions and Definitions 
By altering the Hughes Salvo Model [Ref. 51, it is possible to develop a low- 
resolution model of heterogeneous forces to support analysis of the CNAN force, as well 
as current forces, and their tactical use. However, there are two necessary assumptions to 
develop a simple variation of this model. First, as in the homogeneous model, the rate of 
loss for an Ai unit is linear in relation to the number of successful hits from all B, enemy 
units attacking. Second, there is no direct synergism between systems, that is, attrition 
does not depend upon coordination between units of the same force. It seems reasonable 
that the first assumption should hold, but further analysis is necessary to investigate the 
validity of the second assumption. The model’s core remains that the change in a force’s 
size after a salvo exchange is equal to the total attrition caused by an opposing force. 
In the homogeneous salvo equation, the characteristic values for the staying 
power, offensive potential and defensive potential for all entities are aggregated into three 
values that are used in the simple model. This generalization leads to a quick and broad 
analysis and it is fairly accurate when the various units are similar in capabilities, that is, 
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there is little difference between different units. However, as the differences in the ships’ 
characteristics increase, the aggregated terms fail to capture the essence of any particular 
platform and the desirable tactics that each side should try to employ. To illustrate, say 
that a particular soccer goalkeeper has superior defensive capabilities, but no offense 
capability. The rest of the team has a low value for defense but a large value for offense. 
By aggregating the goalkeeper’s values with those of the rest of the team and taking the 
average, the goalkeeper’s defenses are artificially lowered while the rest of the team’s 
defenses rise. A similar effect holds for the offensive capabilities. To better capture the 
contributions of each member of the team, or force, requires a method that separates the 
various characteristics while maintaining the simplicity of the salvo model. 
In the homogeneous salvo equation, the number of hits sustained by a force is 
defined as the difference between the enemy’s offensive power and the force’s defensive 
power. For the purpose of exposition, let there be two forces, Blue and Red, each 
composed of truly homogeneous units. The battle between two ships is a trivial one-on- 
one battle. If, however, the battle is between a Blue force (of size n ships) and a single 
Red ship, then it is possible to view the battle as a series of n-sequential one-on-one 
battles. The number of hits sustained by the Red ship is then the sum of all the salvos 
from the n Blue ships minus the Red ship’s defensive salvos. This is the numerator of the 
salvo equation. Now, a Blue ship can be hit if and only if the single Red ship targets and 
fires a salvo at it. Unlike the Red hits, the number of hits on the Blue force is the sum of 
hits from each one-on-one exchange with the Red ship. The third case is a battle between 
a force of n-Blue ships and a force of m-Red ships-an n-on-m battle. As in the second 
case, the total hits is the sum of n, one-on-m battles, where an individual Blue ship can be 
hit if and only if one or more of the m Red ships target and fire one or more salvos 
against it. The same is true for the total hits on the Red force. In all cases the reduction 
in force size, from the salvo equation, is the total number of hits sustained divided by the 
total staying power. If the two forces are not homogeneous, but are composed of 
different types of ships or weapon systems, then the change in the force size (AA) is sum 
of the results of all n, one-on-m engagements. By introducing two additional parameters, 
it is possible to modify the homogeneous salvo equation to allow analysis of two 
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heterogeneous forces, composed of different groups of similar weapon systems. The first 
parameter, oflensive targeting parameter, is a number between zero and one that 
indicates the fraction of units in a particular group that engage an enemy group. In the 
case were each group is made up of single ship, then some fraction of the ship's combat 
potential is targeted against one of the opponent's ships. The second parameter, the 
defensive targeting parameter, is similar to the offensive targeting parameter. This 
number indicates the fraction of a group's defenses applied against the combat power of a 
specific enemy group. 
2. Heterogeneous Salvo Model 
The notion of an offensive and a defensive targeting parameter, used to divide a 
unit's or force's combat power among multiple enemy units or forces, is similar to the 
allocation term used when describing modeling heterogeneous forces using Lanchester 
type attrition models. [Ref. 101 Adding the two targeting parameters to the salvo 
equation and summing over all combinations gives the following generalized 
heterogeneous salvo equation for B attacking A. 
r n n  
AA = xx(a t t r i t ion  of Ai unit caused by Bj  ) 
i=] j=1 
pji = Offensive combat potential of Bj units against Aj. { hits/shooting unit} 
y ~ j i  = Fraction of Bj units that engage Ai units. { [O,l]} 
Bj = Number of B units of type j .  { B, units} 
Tj = Defensive combat power of side Ai against Bj units. {shots /defending units} 
Oij = Fraction of Ai units that engage Bj units. { [0,1]} 
Ai = Number of A units of type i. {A, units} 
61 = Staying power of Ai unit. {hits} 
Oji = Scouting effectiveness of unit Bj against Ai. { [O,l]} 
Zji = Training effectiveness of unit Bj against Ai. { [0,1] } 
pij = Distraction factor of unit Ai against Bj. { [0,1] } 
6ij = Defender alertness or readiness of unit Ai against Bj. { [0,1] } 
AA = The number of A units put out of action . 
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As in the homogeneous model, the offensive and defensive effectiveness 
parameters, (ojiTjipij)and (8ij~ij) , are composite indices [0,1] of scouting, training, and 
distraction factors that are used to degrade an attacker or defender's capabilities. For 
example, a unit consisting of four missiles, but is only 50% trained, can only apply two 
missiles against an opponent. 
From this equation, the change in size of Ai unit is the sum of all simultaneous 
battles against the j enemy forces. 
3. 
Letting Oji equal the offensive coefficients for Bj attacking Ai and letting Dij equal 
Heterogeneous Salvo Model in Matrix Notation 
the defensive coefficients for Ai units defending against Bj, then, expanding and 
rearranging terms, the Salvo Equation can be written as 
. h ~ ,  = (o,~B, + o ~ ~ B ~  + . . . + o ~ ~ B ~ ) - ( D ~ ~  + D ~ ~  +...+ D,)A~. 
To illustrate this transformation, let i=l and j=2. 
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Generalizing, the Salvo Equation takes the matrix form 
O B ~ - D A = A A  
0 = Matrix of offensive coefficients = 
, where Oji = ojl 0 T ~ ,  0 pjiT 0 Pji 0 Y j i  0 [l/sji p 
OIi ... oji 
D = Matrix of defensive coefficients = 
[DIl +...+D,j 0 0 O 1  
0 Dzl +...+ D ,  0 0 
, where D, = 6,, 0~~ 'i 0 y, 0 O,J 0 [l/gf, p 
0 0 
0 0 Di, +...+ DijJ l o  
B = Matrix of B-units. 
A = Matrix of A-units. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The heterogeneous model is an extension of the homogeneous salvo model that 
gives the analysts a greater degree of flexibility to examine and model the unique 
characteristics of heterogeneous forces. With this increase in flexibility is an increase in 
the number of parameters that must be accounted for and processed. In the homogeneous 
salvo model, the modeler had two forces, each with five to seven parameters. In the 
heterogeneous model, the worst case could result in m x  n different mini-engagements, 
each with five to seven parameters. A solution to this complex accounting is the 
transformation of the heterogeneous salvo model into matrix notation. While providing a 
compact form to use, it also exploits the existing body of theorems and proofs associated 
with matrix mathematics. 
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111. HETEROGENEOUS MODEL EXAMINATION WITH HISTORICAL 
DATA 
This chapter examines the accuracy of the heterogeneous salvo model by 
comparing its results with those from a previous work that tested Hughes’ salvo model. 
That previous work done by Thomas Beall, [Ref. 111 gathered data on various naval 
battles and, using that information as model inputs, calculated the resulting combat power 
loss of each naval force. This chapter examines the accuracy of the heterogeneous salvo 
model’s calculations by comparing them against those of Beall’s thesis. 
A. HISTORICAL DATA VALIDATION OF NAVAL BATTLE MODEL 
Beall’s work [Ref. 111 used data from historical naval battles to verify his own 
computer model, which was based upon the Hughes Salvo Model. Through data 
analysis, Beall captured the mathematical essences of 14 World War I and I1 naval 
battles. He then used that data to simulate the battles and to compare their results with 
actual outcomes. 
1. Background on Beall Analysis 
Beall used historical data in survivability analysis to develop a method to 
calculate the staying power value for any surface warships. His goal was to model the 
number of hits required to inflict a firepower kill, i.e., sufficient damage to prevent a unit 
from contributing further combat power as a function of its displacement. The standard 
weapon used through out his analysis was the 1000-pound heavy case bomb, which had 
an equivalent explosive weight of 660 pounds of TNT. The resulting 
equation, N = 0.070369 x di~placernent;’~ , is used to provide an appropriate value that 
describes the staying power of a warship. 
To determine the offensive potential, Beall first separated weapon and platform 
characteristics into two combat potential categories: continuous combat power and 
pulsed combat power. Using the “ballistic mortar strength” and rate of fire, Beall was 
able to calculate the explosive weight per minute that a particular gun system on a 
specific platform was capable of firing. He calculated the combat potential of a specific 
continuous weapon as the amount of Thousand Pound Bomb Equivalent (TPBE) that can 
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x2.5. The constant, 2.5, gives added weight be fired by a gun per minute, calculated by -
660 lbs 
weight to a gun’s shell over that of a bomb of equal explosive weight due to the 
additional lunetic energy that the shell imparts upon impact [Ref. 113. Beall derived this 
constant through survivability analysis. The aggregated continuous combat potential for 
a platform is the sum of all gun systems on the platform. The aggregated continuous 
combat potential for an entire group of ship is the sum of all the individual ship’s combat 
continuous combat potential. 
Battles involving pulsed weapons (torpedo salvos or air wing strikes) required a 
slightly different approach to calculate the combat power. A group’s total pulsed combat 
power is calculated using the following equation: 
TNT equiv. weight 
660 Ibs 
x Number of weapons per salvox Wtp . 
The parameter, Wtp, is a scalar used to give torpedoes additional combat power since 
their destruction occurs at or below the waterline and inflicts more damage than bombs. 
In Beall’s analysis and this thesis, bombs have a Wpt value of 1.0 and torpedoes have a 
value of 1.25. Beall calculated the total group pulsed combat potential and weapon 
effectiveness by weapon type for each group in a force. His model, however, does not 
distinguish group pulsed power. Rather, it uses a single value for the total pulsed power 
fired by all groups. This eliminates the requirement to track specific pulsed weapons and 
their effect. 
In order to compare the analytical results with the historical data, Beall expressed 
the outcome as a percent of firepower lost by each force. Since it was not possible to 
attribute specific damage done to a ship with its firepower loss, a lower and upper bound 
was calculated for the entire force. The results of Beall’s analysis are then compared 
with the combat power loss interval. The lower limits of this loss interval “represent the 
percent of a force’s [combat power] carried by all of the force’s platforms suffering at 
least a firepower kill during a given battle. The upper limits represent the percent of 
[combat power] carried by all of the force’s platforms suffering at least some damage in 
the battle.” [Ref. 1 11 In this chapter, the calculated firepower losses from Beall‘s analysis 
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are compared with the calculations from the heterogeneous salvo model, for three of the 
14 battles. 
2. 
This chapter uses Microsoft@ Excel [Ref. 121 spreadsheet as the calculating device 
to implement the heterogeneous salvo model. It was chosen because it is widely 
available and requires only minimal programming skills to setup the model. This product 
does have some limitation on its usefulness and so the readers are urged to implement the 
heterogeneous salvo model by whatever method aids analysis. 
Setup of the Heterogeneous Salvo Model for Analysis 
To implement the heterogeneous salvo model so that it would replicate the results 
of Beall’s data for gunfire, it was necessary to make two modifications. As in the Beall’s 
simulation, the implementation of the heterogeneous salvo model can be structured to 
calculate the results of “salvos” in one-minute increments. 
The first modification transforms Beall’s homogeneous, continuous fire data for 
direct implementation in the heterogeneous salvo model. Beall divides the opposing 
forces into separate groups of ships that operate together throughout a battle. To 
determine the combat power for each group, he summed the combat power of every ship 
in that group. This total then becomes the parameter value used in the model. This 
process was also done to calculate each group’s staying power. 
Using Beall’s aggregated data, the groups are disaggregated, or separated into 
individual ship with equal weights. This transforms any single battle event from a one- 
on-one battle to an m-on-n battle, where all m or n ships have the same characteristics. 
To illustrate, say Group A is composed of five ships with a combat power of 6.0, 1 .O, 1 .O, 
1.0, and 1.0 for a total combat power of 10.0 for the group. The heterogeneous model 
transforms Group A back into five units each with a combat power of 2.0. This is an 
artifact of the process of checking the model’s accuracy with Beall’s analysis. If this was 
an independent application of the heterogeneous model, it would use two groups. Group 
A would have one ship with a combat power of 6.0 and Group B would have four ships 
with a combat power of 1 .O each. Additionally, pulsed power weapons are not associated 
with the firing platform from which they were fired. Instead, each pulsed weapon type 
serves as an independent Bj unit where the combat power parameter, pji, remains constant 
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throughout the battle. 
exchange and is calculated independently using the historical data. 
The size of pulsed power weapons varies with each salvo 
The second modification to the heterogeneous salvo model is to determine the 
offensive effectiveness for the two forces in any given battle. Through research, Beall 
was able to determine the total number of hits scored by groups of ships during a battle. 
This number was divided by either the total number of rounds fired, if known, or the 
expected total number of rounds fired, which is calculated based upon the composition of 
weapons and their characteristic rate of fire. Throughout this chapter the offensive 
effectiveness is substituted for (OjiZjipji) in the heterogeneous salvo model and labeled Eji. 
Beall’s data is divided into three categories that are based upon the type of 
weapon fire present in the battle. First, “continuous fire battles” are those in which 
gunfire was applied continuously by each side as the primary means of inflicting damage. 
Second, “pulsed fire battles” are those in which effective combat power was applied in 
pulses, either by using aerial bombs or torpedoes. Third, “mixed fire battles” are those in 
which both continuous and pulsed fire was used in the battle. [Ref. 113 Of the 14 battles 
examined, the analysis of three representative battles are presented: The Battle of 
Coronel (01 November 1914), The Battle of Coral Sea (07 May 1942), and The Battle of 
Savo Island (08 August 1942). In the following sections, the historical summary of the 
battle and the calculations of parameters for each force are presented. The results of the 
heterogeneous salvo model are presented and compared against the data gathered by 
Beall. 
B. BATTLE OF CORONEL 
The Battle of Coronel is a World War I naval engagement between three British 
ships (Good Hope, Monmouth, and Glasgow) and four German ships (Schamhorst, 
Gneisenau, Leipzig, and Dresden). The Schamhorst and Gneisenau are the first ships to 
open fire at Good Hope and Monmouth; the three British ships soon afterwards return 
fire. Dresden and Leipzig open fire on Glasgow, driving her out of the engagement. At 
the end of the battle, both Good Hope and Monmouth are sunk, while Glasgow, 
Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau were damaged. [Ref. 113 
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1. 
In The Battle of Coronel, Beall estimated the weapons effectiveness for 
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau by calculating the number of hits the two ships scored (50) in 
the 28 minutes of fire and dividing it by the total number of shells fired (1800). Similarly 
the Dresden and Leipzig each scored five hits and fired a total of 400 shells in two 
minutes. Glasgow fired for 15 minutes and is estimated to have fired 210 shells with six 
hits. Table 1 is a summary of the data gathered by Beall for The Battle of Coronel. 
Beall Analysis of The Battle of Coronel 
Table I .  Summary of Beall Data for the Battle of Coronel 
Beall calculated a combat power loss interval of 94.18% - 100.00% for the British 
force and a loss interval of 0.00% - 49.92% for the German force. His simulation 
calculated a 94.77% loss of combat power for the British force and 2.67% for the German 
force. Since these firepower loss values lie within the corresponding loss intervals, Beall 
concluded that the simulation results are valid. 
2. 
Using the heterogeneous salvo model, the number of ships remaining after each of 
the two events is calculated. In the first event there are a total of six simultaneous one- 
on-one engagements: Scharnhorst vs. Good Hope, Scharnhorst vs. Monmouth, 
Gneisenau vs. Good Hope, Gneisenau vs. Monmouth, Glasgow vs. Scharnhorst, and 
Glasgow vs. Gneisenau. Since parameters were derived from the average of the 
corresponding parameter in the Beall data, we expect the results from Scharnhorst vs. 
Heterogeneous Salvo Model Analysis of The Battle of Coronel 
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. 
Good Hope to be the same as Gneisenau vs. Good Hope, and similarly for the other 
group pairings. In the second event there are four simultaneous one-on-one 
engagements: Dresden vs. Glasgow, Leipzig vs. Glasgow, Glasgow vs. Dresden, and 
Glasgow vs. Leipzig. 
From the historical data provided by Beall, the first event to takes place in The 
Battle of Coronel is an engagement where Scharnhorst and Gneisenau open fire on Good 
Hope and Monmouth for 18 minutes. The inputs for the heterogeneous salvo model are: 
pi1 = p21= p 3 1 =  2.16 
p 1 3 =  p 2 3 =  p 3 3 =  2.165 
p 1 4 =  p24= p 3 4 =  2.165 
~1 = 52 = 1.605 
5 3  = ~ p =  1.23 
~ 1 1  = ~ 1 2  = ~ 2 1  = ~ 2 2  = ~ 3 1  = ~ 3 2  = 0.028 
~ 3 1  = ~ 3 2  = ~ 4 1  = ~ 4 2  = ~ 3 3  = ~ 4 3  = 0.012 
pI2= pZ2= p 3 ? =  2.16 
For purpose of exposition the calculations involved in one time step are 
demonstrated. The parameter yji, the fraction of B, units that engage Ai, varies with time 
depending on whether that B, units actually fired a weapon during that time interval. The 
following calculation is for A l ,  Good Hope, for first time step: 
0 . 0 2 8 ~  2.16x0.5 x 1 .O 0 . 0 2 8 ~  2 . 1 6 ~ 0 . 5 ~  1 .O AAl = + + 
1.605 1 A05 
-  0.012 x 2.165 x Ox 1.0 0 . 0 1 2 ~  2.165 x Ox 1 .O + 
1.605 1.605 
AA, = 0.037 
Since Scharnhorst and Gneisenau engage both Good Hope and Monmouth 
simultaneously during the first minute, their corresponding y,i value is 0.5. An 
equivalent calculation is made for A2, Monmouth, with identical results. No other ships 
fired during the first minute so all other calculations are expected to resemble the 
following: 
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AA3 = + + 0.028 x 2.16 x Ox 1 .O 0.028 x 2 . 1 6 ~  Ox 1 .O 
0.42 0.42 
- 0.012 x 2.165 x 0 x 1 .O 0.012 x 2.165 x Ox 1 .O + 
0.42 0.42 
AA3 = 0.00 
3. Conclusions 
After 28 calculations, representing the 28 minutes of combat, the heterogeneous 
salvo model calculates that the Good Hope and Monmouth are both destroyed, i.e., AAi E 
1 for both ships. The model calculates AAi = 0.084 for the Glasgow, resulting in a total 
remaining force size of 0.916 ships for the British force. The model calculates a AB, = 
0.053 for the Schumhorst and Gneisenuu, reducing the German force to 3.894 ships. The 
corresponding firepower loss is 94.76% for the British force and 2.67% for the German 
force. When comparing the heterogeneous salvo model calculations with those from 
Beall’s simulation, it is shown that the results are identical, which is what was expected. 
C. BATTLE OF CORAL SEA 
The Battle of Coral Sea examines the effects of pulsed weapons using the 
heterogeneous salvo model. Beall considered only engagements between aircraft 
carriers, using airplanes as the delivery platform for combat power. The U.S. force 
consisted of the two aircraft carriers, Lexington and Yorktown. The Lexington displaced 
43055 tons and carried 17 Dauntless, 17 Dauntless Scouts, and 11 Devastators. The 
Dauntless was capable of carrying one 1OOOlb HC bomb, the Scout carried one 5001b HC 
bomb, and the Devastator carried one 22.4” torpedoes. The Yorktown displaced 25484 
tons, carrying 17 Dauntlesses, 17 Dauntless Scouts, and 10 Devastators. The Japanese 
force consisted of the aircraft carriers Shokuku and Zuikuku. The Shokuku displaced 
32105 tons, carrying 17 Vals and 13 Kate airplanes. The Vals were armed with one 
250kg SAP bomb and the Kate carried one 18” torpedoes. The Zuikuku displaced 32105 
tons and carried 16 Vals and 12 Kates. [Ref. 111 
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The Battle of Coral Sea began with the U.S. carriers launching an air strike of 28 
Dauntless and 20 Devastators, and the Japanese launching 33 Vals and 18 Kates at the 
U.S. carriers. In the first event, 24 Dauntless and 9 Devastators survive to attack the 
Japanese force, scoring 2 hits on the Shokuku with lOOOlb bombs. In the second event, 
the Japanese strike force hits the Lexington with two 250kg SAP bombs and two 18” 
torpedoes, and hits the Yorktown with one 250kg. SAP bomb. In the final event, a second 
U.S. strike force attacked the Shokuku, scoring one hit with one lOOOlb HC bomb. At the 
conclusion of battle, the Yorktown was sunk and the Shokuku suffered a firepower kill. 
[Ref. 111 
1. 
With the introduction of the airplane as delivery platforms for bombs and 
torpedoes, this battle resembles what Hughes refers to as salvo warfare [Ref. 51. In this 
battle, the aircraft carriers have no offensive power other than the aircraft and weapons 
they carry, but are themselves the targets of enemy fire. Beall refers to this combination 
of weapon and delivery platform as pulsed power. The pulsed power effectiveness is 
calculated as a function of both the aircraft’s survival and the bomb’s detonation. In this 
battle 46 Dauntlesses were launched and three hits were attributed to this airplane type. 
This gave the lOOOlb bomb an effectiveness parameter of 0.065 per hit. Similarly, the 
Japanese launched 33 Vals, scoring three hits, had an effectiveness of 0.091. 
Additionally, 18 Kates launched with two hits, giving the Japanese torpedo an 
effectiveness of 0.11 1. [Ref. 113 Table 2 is a summary of the data gathered by Beall for 
the Battle of Coral Sea. 
Beall Analysis of the Battle of Coral Sea 
Since the Lexington was lost and the Yorktown was damaged, Beall calculated the 
loss interval for the U.S. forces as 50.48% - 100.00%. The Japanese carrier Shokuku was 
damaged during the battle, resulting in a loss interval of 51.90% - 51.90%. Beall’s 
simulation calculated the U.S. force’s firepower loss as 53.35% and 51.90% for the 
Japanese force. Since both results fell within the combat power loss intervals, the model 















12.10 1 2.42 0.09 1 0.1 11 
Table 2. Summary of Beall Data for the Battle of Coral Sea. 
2. Heterogeneous Salvo Model Analysis of the Battle of Coral Sea 
The Battle of Coral Sea demonstrates a venue for which heterogeneous salvo 
model was intended. In this battle there are three separate salvo exchanges between the 
U.S. and Japanese forces. The first exchange is between the U.S. aircraft against the 
Japanese aircraft carrier Shokaku. The second exchange takes place when Japanese 
planes from both aircraft carriers attack the two U.S. carriers. The last exchange is 
between the aircraft from the Lexington and the Shokaku. 
In the first exchange, 24 Dauntlesses and 9 Devastators survived to attack the 
Japanese ships. The combat power of the Dauntlesses is as 1.00 TPBE/pulse. Beall does 
not use the combat power of the 9 Devastators (0.785 each) because they had no effect in 
the model. For completeness, the Devastators are included in the heterogeneous salvo 
model, with a combat effectiveness of 0.0 TBPE/minute. This prevents the airplanes and 
their payloads from contributing any combat power against any target. Table 3 gives a 












Bj Eji Pji si 
1 0.00 0.00 2.42 
1 0.00 0.00 2.07 
m 0.065 1 .oo 0.00 
m 0.000 0.466 0.00 
m 0.00 0.758 0.00 
1 0.00 0.00 2.42 
1 0.00 0.00 2.24 
n 0.09 1 0.216 0.00 
n 0.1 1 1  0.93 1 0.00 
Table 3. Summary of Coral Sea Data for the Heterogeneous Salvo 1 Iodel 
The first event in the battle is a 2 x 2 engagement between the two U.S. carriers 
and two Japanese carriers, but reduces to one-on-one battle between the Dauntlesses and 
the Shokaku. To demonstrate the results of the first event of this battle, the calculations 
for Japanese attrition and the resulting reduction of force size are presented. 
hB, = i [ & j i ~ j i ; i ~ j )  1- 
j=1 
E l l ~ l l y l l A l  + E21P21y21A2 + &31p31y31A3 + E 4 1 ~ 4 1 y 4 1 A 4  + ‘ 5 l P 5 l Y 5 l A 5  
s1 51 GI s1 s1 
0.000 x 0.000 x 0 x 0 0.000 x 0.000 x 0 x 0 0.065 x 1 .O x 1 .O x 24.0 
2.42 2.42 2.42 
0.000 x 0.758 x 0.0 x 9.0 0.000 x 0.000 x 0 x 0 
AB, = + + + 
+ 
2.42 2.42 
AB, = 0.645 
B, =0.355 
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m 2 = q  5 EjiPji  ( y j i  *i A j )  )= 
j=l 
E12P12y12Al + E22P22y22A2 + E32P32y32A3 + E42P42y42A4 + E52P52y52A5 
5 2  5 2  5 2  52 52 
+ O.OOOxO.OOOxOxO O.OOOxO.OOOxOxO 0.065xl.OxO.Ox24.0 
2.42 2.42 2.42 
O.OOOxO.758xO.Ox9.O O.OOOxO.OOOxOxO 
2.42 2.42 
m2 = + + 
+ 
AB2 = 0.000 
B2 =1.00 
AB = 0.645 
B = 1.355 
The heterogeneous model calculates the Shokuku and its combat power, if it had any, are 
reduced by 64.5%. Since no U.S. aircraft attack the Zuikuku, the model, as expected, 
calculates no reduction in its size. The second exchange involves the 33 Japanese Vals 
attacking both U.S. carriers, while 25 Kates torpedo the Lexington. The model calculates 
90.3% attrition to the Lexington, i.e. AAI = 0.903, and 15.7% attrition to the Yorktown, 
i.e., A A 2  = 0.157. The heterogeneous salvo equation calculation for the Yorktown’s 
attrition is provided below. The equation for AA2 is similar except ~ 4 2  = 0.0 and 52 = 
2.07. 
O.OOOxO.OOOxOxO O.OOOxO.OOOxOxO 0.091x0.216x0.5x33.0 
0.111~0.931~1.0~18 
AA, = + + + 
2.42 2.42 2.42 
2.42 
AA, = 0.903 
A, =0.097 
In the last exchange, four U.S. Dauntlesses and 11 Devastators attack the Shokuku. 
Without demonstrating further calculations or details, the heterogeneous salvo equation 
calculates AE31 = 0.107, which reduces the fraction size of the Shokuku to 0.248. 
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3. Conclusions 
Comparing the heterogeneous salvo model’s calculation for the fractional combat 
power loss, it is shown that the calculated results lie within Beall’s loss interval. The 
model calculates that A1 = 0.097 and A? = 0.843 at the end of the battle. This 
corresponds to a combat power loss of 53.84%. The model calculates that B1 = 0.248 and 
B2 =1.0 at the end of the battle, which corresponds to a combat power loss of 39.00%. 
The difference in the combat power loss for the Japanese force results from a difference 
in interpretation of the Shokaku results. The heterogeneous salvo model calculates that 
there is a 75.2% reduction in Shokaku’s size, or combat power. Beall claims that the 
Shokaku suffered a firepower lull, which reduces its combat power to 0.0. If a 75.2% 
firepower reduction is sufficient criteria to claim a firepower kill, then the heterogeneous 
salvo model results fall within the computed intervals. 
D. BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND 
The Battle of Salvo Island is a mixed battle, combining both continuous and 
pulsed power weapons, between the U.S. and Japanese naval forces. The U.S. force was 
composed of 15 ships, divided into seven groups. The Japanese force had eight ships in 
to two groups. In addition to their main battery guns, both forces had pulsed power 
systems in the form of torpedoes. The U.S. force used the MK15 21” torpedo and the 
British MKIX 21” torpedo. The Japanese force used both the 24” TYPE 93 and 21” 6 
YR TYPE torpedoes. [Ref. 111 
The battle consists of a sequence of continuous fire engagements, with pulsed 
power engagements interspersed throughout. The battle began with a simultaneous 
pulsed and continuous fire attack by the Japanese force against the Chicago and 
Canberra. Two torpedoes and 24 shells struck the Canberra; the Chicago was hit by one 
torpedo. The Japanese force then opened fire with guns and shot 16 torpedoes at the 
Vincennes, Astoria, and Quincy, scoring numerous hits by shells and torpedoes. The 
Vincennes, Astoria, and Quincy return fire at Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa, Furutaka, and 
Chokai, scoring several hits. Finally, the U.S. ships Blue and Ralph Talbot engaged the 
Japanese force, which returned fire, hitting Ralph Talbot with four shells. 
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1. 
In the Battle of Savo Island, Beall divided the U.S. force into seven groups and 
the Japanese force into two groups. The first U.S. group was composed of Vincennes, 
Astoria, and Quincy and fired 107 shells in one minute, scoring a total of four hits. The 
only other ships to fire effectively were Blue and Ralph Talbot, firing 385 shells in two 
minutes and scoring one hit. The U S .  force fired no torpedoes with effectiveness. The 
five Japanese cruisers fired a total of 1020 shells in five minutes scoring 92 hits. The 
entire Japanese force fired 61 torpedoes scoring seven hits. No other Japanese ship fired 
with effect in this battle. [Ref. 111 Table 4 is a summary of the parameters calculated 
and used by Beall in his simulation. 
Beall Analysis of the Battle of Savo Island 
Table 4. Summary of Beall Data for the Battle of Savo Island 
In the mixed battle, Beall calculated a combat power loss interval for both the 
continuous fire weapons and the pulsed power weapons. The Vincennes, Astoria, 
Quincy, Canberra and Ralph Talbot were lost, the Chicago suffered a firepower kill, and 
the Patterson was heavily damaged. Beall calculated a combat power loss interval of 
38.89%-43.60% for continuous fire weapons and 10.49%-21.18% for pulsed weapons. 
The Japanese cruisers Kinugasa and Chokui were damaged, resulting in a loss interval of 
0.00%-39.47% for continuous fire weapons and 0.00%-37.3 1 % for pulsed weapons. 
[Ref. 111 Beall’s simulation calculated a 39.77% continuous combat power loss and 
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12.28% pulsed power loss for the U.S. force, both of which lie within the computed 
interval. The Japanese force had a 0.16% continuous combat power loss and 0.16% 
pulsed power loss, which was also within the computed interval. 
2. Heterogeneous Salvo Model Analysis of the Battle of Savo Island 
The Battle of Savo Island examines the heterogeneous salvo model’s capability to 
calculate hits and force size reductions for different types of weapons simultaneously. 
Since continuous combat power has effect over time, the model’s implementation is 
similar to that of the Battle of Coronel. Force reduction, again, is calculated in one- 
minute intervals of time. At each interval, the model calculates the effects of all 
continuous fire and any pulsed weapons that impact during that interval. Table 5 lists the 
heterogeneous salvo model parameters for the Battle of Savo Island. The parameters, Yji, 
for the fraction of Ai units that engage Bj are not listed in this table since their value 
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sland Data for the Heterogeneous Salvo Model 
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For the purpose of exposition, one calculation of the heterogeneous salvo model 
for the U.S. force is demonstrated. Specifically, the results at time five are shown. At 
this point in the battle, the Japanese heavy cruisers attack the Chicago and Canberra with 
guns and by torpedoes. 
j=1 ( 5i 
E1,6P1,6y1,6B 1 + '2.6P 2,6y2,6B 2 E9.6P9,6Y9,6B9 + E10,6P10,6Y10,6B!0 +...+ AA' = " 
5 6  5 6  5 6  5 6  
+ 0.090~ 2.37 x 0.5 x 1 
O.OxO.833xO.OxO 
0.090~ 2.37 x 0.5 x 1 0.1 15 x 2.001 x 0.5 x 17 AA6 = + +...+ 
1.655 1.655 1.655 
1.655 
AA6 = 1.504 
A, =O.OO 
The model calculates the amount of offensive power each Japanese ship contributes to 
the battle. It also includes in this calculation the combat power contributions of the 
torpedoes fired by the Japanese force. The calculation for the Canberra is the same as 
the Chicago. Since no other ships are involved in this event the U.S. force size at the end 
of time five is 13. 
Without showing further computations, we state that the heterogeneous salvo 
model calculates the loss of the Vincennes, Astoria, Quincy, Chicago and Canberra. It 
also calculates that the Blue and Ralph Talbot are reduced by 56.6%. The Japanese 
heaver cruisers suffer a 2.3% reduction in strength, while the remaining Japanese ships 
are reduced by 6.00%. This leads to a continuous combat power loss of 39.64% and 
pulsed power loss of 11.90% for the U.S. force. The calculated Japanese continuous 
combat power loss is 1.68% and the pulsed power loss is 2.15%. 
3. Conclusions 
The combat loss percentages derived from the results of the heterogeneous salvo 
model's lie within the loss intervals for both continuous and pulsed weapons. The U.S. 
percentages match those calculated by Beall's simulation, but the values for the Japanese 
force differ slightly. This difference is a result from the heterogeneous model calculation 
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of hits against the Chicago and Blue. Since Beall’s data indicated that the Japanese 
forces targeted group 7, consisting of Blue and Ralph Tulbot, the heterogeneous model 
assumes a value of 0.5 as input for ~,,14 and \vj,l5 (b’ j). The resulting calculations 
indicate a 56.6% reduction of combat power for both ships, but historically, Ralph Tulbot 
was lost and Blue suffered no damage, resulting in a 50% combat power loss. If, 
however, the model concentrates the Japanese combat power at Ralph Talbot ( ~ j , l 5  = 1.0 
V j), then its results correspond with that of the historical outcome. The resulting 
continuous power loss remains 39.03% and 10.50% for pulsed power, which is the same 
as Beall’s model. Similarly, the difference in combat power losses for the Japanese force 
results from the interpretation of the U.S. Vji. input parameters. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
To utilize the heterogeneous salvo model successfully, it is essential to ensure that 
the results of its calculations are accurate and meaningful. Beall’s naval battle model 
provides an excellent opportunity to use historical naval battles and their data with which 
to test and compare the structure of the heterogeneous salvo model. His model, which 
was based partially on the Hughes Salvo Model, calculated the combat power lost in each 
force in the battle. Using Beall’s data and methodology, this examination has been able 
to reproduce three representative battles with the heterogeneous salvo equation as the 
model’s core. 
By demonstrating that the heterogeneous salvo model is capable of accurately 
reproducing the results of historical battles, we are able to explore alternate applications 
of the model. In contrast to the homogeneous salvo model, the heterogeneous model 
adds an additional layer of depth to salvo warfare, allowing examination of tactics and 
strategies. Though the homogeneous salvo model might produce acceptable results, 
using averaged data as model input can lead to optimistic or pessimistic values. The 
heterogeneous salvo model allows more accurate calculations. 
Finally, it has been demonstrated that the heterogeneous salvo model can be used 
to model continuous fire by partitioning of gunfire into short time steps. 
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IV. HETEROGENEOUS SALVO MODEL IN NAVAL ANALYSIS 
This chapter examines a hypothetical campaign scenario and demonstrate how the 
heterogeneous salvo model can be used to aid in tactical decision-makmg. The scenario 
used in this chapter is based upon an unpublished problem statement [Ref. 141 by Wayne 
Hughes, Jr., given in his Campaign Analysis course at the Naval Postgraduate School to a 
group of 11 U.S. and international students. In it he presents a hypothetical maritime 
conflict between Greece, Turkey, and the United States. The students, divided into 
groups, were tasked with formulating a campaign strategy for their group and then 
providing a detailed analysis of a battle. 
The concept of operations for the employment of friendly forces within the 
context of that scenario was developed by Michael Johns, Charles McCaffrey, and 
Donald Humpart [Ref. 151. This thesis reflects the application of the heterogeneous salvo 
model by the author as an analysis tool for the given scenario and concept of operations. 
This chapter illustrates the differences between the homogeneous and heterogeneous 
salvo models through comparative analysis of the scenario and concept of operations. 
The remaining sections demonstrate the heterogeneous salvo model’s use in choosing the 
most desirable weapons load that enables the U.S. forces to successfully accomplish its 
mission. 
A. ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHETICAL U.S. NAVAL ENGAGEMENT 
1. Mini-Study Scenario 
The purpose of this mini-study scenario is to examine the use of the 
heterogeneous salvo model to assist in developing, executing, and analyzing a military 
campaign. Although the circumstances are hypothetical, the scenario has the advantage 
of using actual order of battles with specific combat characteristics. Thus, it lends itself 
to clear-cut illustrations of the heterogeneous salvo equations in tactically realistic 
circumstances. The study examines the United States’ ability to prevent the invasion and 
conquest of five Greek islands in the Aegean Sea by the Republic of Turkey. The two 
nations had recently engaged in a naval battle over the island of Cyprus in which the 
Greek military lost half of their ships and aircraft. Using its temporary advantage, 
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Turkey aspires to reclaim the islands of Limnos, LCsvos, Khios, Simos, and K6s, which 
have been under Greek control for almost a century. Through reliable intelligence 
sources, the United States finds out about Turkey’s plans. The President of the United 
States orders the U S .  military to prevent the take over. For simplicity of exposition, the 
Greece force will be regarded as unavailable for direct combat assistance because of their 
prior losses in the battle for Cyprus. 
2. Assumptions 
a) United States Forces 
The United States Order of Battle consists four DDG-5 1 Aegis Destroyers 
and two CG-47 Aegis Cruisers on station in the Mediterranean Sea. Each DDG has 30 
SM-2 surface-to-air missiles and eight Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles, configured in 
two, quad launchers. Each CG has 40 SM-2 surface-to-air missiles and eight Harpoon 
anti-ship cruise missiles. The DDGs are capable of defending against nine simultaneous 
threats, while the CGs can defend against 12 simultaneously. A total of 60 U.S. Air 
Force F-16, armed with Maverick air-to-air missiles are available, but require basing in 
theater. 
Additionally, the U.S. force includes 40 small, but heavily armed 
Streetfighter units [Ref. 41. Since Streetfighter is an evolving concept, with endless 
possibilities for its design and configuration, this chapter uses a Streetfighter specified in 
the problem statement [Ref. 141. Each Streetfighter displaces 500 tons and is capable of 
sustaining 40 knots and 2000 nautical miles at 20 knots. The Streetfighter is designed to 
host and operate two Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Their armament includes 
sixteen Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles, divided into four quad launchers, positioned 
such that one-half point in either direction. In addition to passive defensive measures, 
such as chaff or electronic counter measures, each Streetfighter carries a total of eight 
Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM). Once launched, each RAM is capable of 
independently homing on its intended target and is designed to minimize fratricide. For 
the analyses that follow, the Streetfighters will fire a maximum of four Harpoon missiles 
per salvo and up to a maximum of eight RAMS to defend against incoming anti-ship 
missile salvos. For all combatants, the remaining magazine inventory must be calculated 
independently after each salvo exchange or until a specific magazine is exhausted. 
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The Streetfighters are designed to operate in a network-centric fashion, 
i.e., with a high degree of integration and efficient distribution of fire. The UAVs assist 
with target detection, identification, tracking, and battle damage assessment (BDA). This 
gives the U.S. force a scouting and targeting advantage over the Turkish force, allowing 
them to apply a greater amount of combat potential per salvo. 
The U.S. mission is to prevent a Turkish amphibious landing by 
destroying or turning away the warships, thereby stripping escorts from the amphibious 
force and increasing their vulnerability to subsequent U.S. attacks. Once the escort forces 
have been eliminated, it is assumed that the amphibious force will either turn back or be 
easily destroyed by remaining U.S. forces. The proposed tactic is to divide the force into 
three task groups, each assigned to an area of operation (AOO). These AOOs are situated 
off the coast of Turkey, near three naval ports of interest. A task group is responsible for 
engaging all escorts and afterwards, those amphibious ships that do not return to Turkish 
ports. For simplicity and uniformity in these analyses, each squadron is composed of 
twelve Streetfighters and one DDG. The two CGs will operate independently, providing 
air cover and coordination against Turkish air attack for two of the three AOOs. We will 
assume that the remaining units are out of theater for repairs and are not considered for 
further analysis. Each task group has six Streetfighter units and one DDG on station at 
all time. The other six Streetfighters in each task group cycle from a fixed operating 
base, e.g. Athens or Thessaloniki, for fuel, supplies, rest, and rearmament, so in effect act 
as a reserve. 
Initially, it is assumed that the offensive and defensive coordination 
between units is excellent and therefore there is no wasted offensive combat or defensive 
power. In later analyses, we examine what happens when this assumption is not true. It 
is also assumed that the defensive systems are intelligent and are capable of engaging 
threatening targets without duplicative multi-kill. Additionally, the surface units will not 
attempt to offensively target any Turkish aircraft that enter the AOO. For analytical 
purposes, the total number of salvo exchanges between the U.S. and Turkish escort force 
is limited to four. 
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In this study, the United States does not have an aircraft carrier available. 
60 U.S.A.F. F-15s and F-l6s, forward deployed in Greek airfields, are similarly divided 
to cover the three task groups. Thus, 20 are tasked with providing air coverage for each 
specific AOO. The F-16s operate in pairs, maintaining four aircraft on station by rotating 
back to base only after being relieved. The aircraft, in coordination with the CGs, try to 
prevent Turkish aircraft from attacking the U.S. naval force. But, Turkish aircraft that 
survive an air engagement continue to the A 0 0  where they may engage the US .  surface 
group. 
b) Turkish Forces 
The Turkish escort force is composed of five different groups of ships: 2 
ex-U.S. Gearing Frum I class Destroyers, 6 ex-U.S. Perry class Guided Missile Frigates, 
8 MEKO 200 Frigates, 8 ex-U.S. Knox class Fast Frigates, and 20 fast patrol craft (FPC) 
of various types. Each of the groups uses the Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile as the 
primary offensive weapon against enemy ships. All but the Perry class have eight total 
ASCM, distributed in two quad launchers. The Perry class ships carry a total of four 
missiles and use the MK 13 Guided Missile Launching System as the means of delivery. 
The Turkish Navy has three surface-to-air missiles in inventory. The Sea Sparrow 
missiles are the primary surface to air missile (SAM) used by all of combatants, except 
the Perry Frigates, whose primary SAM is the SM-1. Since all SAM are relatively 
equivalent in terms of destructive effect, this study aggregates them all into one surface- 
to-air missile term. 
The primary duty of the Turkish ships is to escort the amphibious ships 
and embarked personnel from their home bases in Izmir, Gulcuk, and Marmaris to the 
five islands of interest. It is assumed that the Turkish invasion plans have been 
predetermined and that once the forces leave port, they proceed directly to the assigned 
target area. Since the Turkish Navy routinely trains with the United States Navy, it is 
assumed that they are aware of U.S. tactics and Streetfighter capabilities. Additionally, 
the Turkish Air Force has a committed 150 attack and fighter aircraft (about 50% of the 
order of battle) to provide advanced warning of U.S. movements and then attack. It is 
assumed that all 150 aircraft are capable of attacking the U.S. force with two anti-ship 
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cruise missiles each. 
defensive potential. 
Thus, the Turkish force has a relatively large offensive and 
Table 6 summarizes what is termed the standard capabilities for each type 
of Turkish and U.S. warship. Since the Turkish naval force must perform multiple 
mission areas (anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine) while escorting the amphibious 
force, it is assumed that they adopt a conservative, less aggressive battle strategy than the 
previous attack against the Greek force. A conservative strategy allows the Turkish force 
to concentrate their ships to protect the amphibious force and minimizes the number of 
offensive salvos. The U.S. force, enjoying the coordination advantage of a network- 
centric environment, is capable of employing a less conservative plan in which they 
aggressively attack the opponent. This coordination advantage, coupled with an 
aggressive “hit and run” strategy, suggests a significantly larger offensive potential for 
the Streetfighters. 
Table 6. Standard Configuration of Missiles and Salvo Size on Platforms 
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c) 
Thus far we have described the two models and have examined a 
descriptive example to assist the readers to familiarize themselves with the salvo models. 
Mathematically, the combat power, defensive power, and staying power are random 
variables, whose values are either known with some distribution, or unknown. It is 
important to provide the model with reasonable approximations for these random 
variables, either through the use of expert opinion, average value, simulated draw, or 
expected value function. 
Deterministic Values Used for Salvo Parameters 
In many instances, the expected value of the random variable is easily 
calculated, or easily known, and is used as a surrogate for the true, unknown value. In 
both versions of the salvo equations, the offensive and defensive load-out of a ship or 
force is typically known or can be calculated. The expected value of the actual staying 
power, the effects of chaff, scouting, anti-scouting, etc. are often used, since they serve as 
practical estimates. To simplify analysis, the effects of scouting, training, distraction, and 
defender alertness of both forces are aggregated into two parameters-an offensive 
effectiveness and defensive effectiveness parameter. In the analysis in Section IV.A., we 
assume that the Turkish offensive and defensive effectiveness have an expected value of 
0.80 and that the U.S. values are 1.0. These values imply that the Turkish Navy is highly 
trained and effective, but is not perfectly effective, while the U.S. force has perfect 
offensive and defensive effectiveness. 
It is possible for a ship to have different values of staying power in terms 
of different offensive weapons. For example, a ship with a staying power of two 
“Penguin” hits may only have a staying power of one “Harpoon” hit. An offensive 
weapon may have an excessive amount of explosive potential, causing more damage than 
necessary to place a ship out of action with a single hit. But the number of hits to put a 
ship out of action is always at least one. 
3. Analysis of Battle 
To evaluate the potential success or failure of the proposed U.S. tactic, this 
analysis examines three scenarios for the U.S. force: one squadron vs. the entire Turkish 
Navy, one squadron vs. 50 percent of the Turkish Navy, and one squadron vs. one-third 
of the Turkish Navy. With these scenarios we expect to find an upper bound on the size 
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of the Turkish force that the U.S. can successfully counter, the associated casualties, and 
the necessary armament. In each case, only those ships of a squadron that are on-station, 
that is, six Streetfighters and one DDG are examined. Initially, the contributions of 
aircraft on both sides are omitted, but will be examined in a separate analysis. As in 
Chapter 3, the analysis uses Microsoy?@ Excel [Ref. 121 Spreadsheet as the calculating 
platform for the heterogeneous salvo model. Additionally, the analysis uses Insightda 
Business Analysis Software for Microsoft@ Excel [Ref. 131 simulation plug-in to Excel to 
assist in generating Monte Car10 simulations. 
In the following homogeneous analyses, the value for the parameters a, p, a3, and 
b3 are calculated off-line and then used in then Hughes model. It is in those off-line 
calculations that the assumption that the Turkish offensive and defensive salvos are only 
80% effective are reflected. These calculations also consider that the value of these 
parameters can never exceed the current level of combat potential (inventory level). To 
calculate these four parameters the following functions are used: 
a3  = minIT, PB A’s remaining defensive potential] 
L A  J 
b, = min -, B’s remaining defensive potential 
a = 0 . 8 0 ~  mi&’, A’s remaining offensive potential] 
p = min[p’, B’S remaining offensive potential] 
where a’and p’ are the maximum offensive salvo sizes. 
1 [ 
After each exchange, the remaining offensive and defensive potentials are 
calculated. For the U.S. and Turkish forces, the remaining offensive potential is 
calculated as the difference between the offensive potential before the exchange and the 
number fired in the exchange (p and a respectively). For the U.S. force, the remaining 
defensive potential is calculated as the difference between the initial defensive potential 
and the number fired in defense, i.e., to shoot down all of enemy offensive salvos fired. 
The remaining Turkish defensive potential is calculated similarly except that the total 
number of missiles fired must be used, including those 20% that were ineffective that 
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each Turkish unit needed to fire to get the value of a3. To calculate this value we 
substitute (a3A)0.80 for a3A and solve for the theoretical value of a; .  




a)  Homogeneous Analysis: Case I 
To establish an upper bound or worst-case, the scenario where a U.S. 
squadron engages the entire Turkish surface force is first examined. Using the values 
from Table 6, the aggregate values for each parameter needed in the homogeneous salvo 
equation are calculated. For example, the aggregated combat potential per ship of the 
Turkish force is total combat power of the force divided by the number of ships in the 
force, which equals 1.545. Using these values, in Table 7,the resulting number of units 






Total Average Average Average Average Average OffensiveIDefensive 
Number Offensive Defensive Staying Offensive Defensive Effectiveness 
ofships salvo Salvo Power Potential Potential 
44 1.545 1.545 1.364 4.909 11.818 0.8 
7 3.714 8.143 1.143 14.857 11.143 1 .o 
PB-0.80(a3A) (7~3.714)-0.80(0.7386~44) 
= 0.00 - AA =  
a1 1.364 
= 0.00 0.80(aA)- b3B - 0.80(1.545~44)- ( 7 .771~  7) AB = - 
bl 1.143 
From the calculations it is shown that both forces have enough defensive 
power to defend against the other’s offensive salvo. The outcome will depend on which 
side exhausts the other side’s offensive or defensive potential/missiles carried first. 
In order to calculate the results of a second exchange, it is necessary to 
calculate and aggregate the offensive and defensive potential remaining off-line and then 
use those numbers as input in the homogeneous salvo equation. In this exchange, the 
offensive and defensive potential remaining are 3.673 and 11.080 respectively, for the 
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Turkish force, and 11.143 and 3.371 respectively for the U.S. force. It is clear that the 
U.S. force expended much more in defense than the Turkish force and, having only 3.371 
defensive shots per ship left, will not be able to completely defend against another 
Turkish offensive. 
= 0.00 





0.80(aA)- b3B - 0.80(1.545~44) - (3.37 1x7) AB = 
The homogeneous salvo model suggests that, having six times more ships, the Turkish 
force is superior to the U.S. force, even when giving the U.S. stronger technological 
capabilities. 
b) Heterogeneous Analysis: Case I 
Using the heterogeneous salvo model and the data in Table 6, the 
calculations indicate a different result. This analysis assumes the Turkish force adopts a 
9-to-2 offensive strategy against the Streetfighters and DDG, that is, 9/11 of their combat 
potential is directed toward the Streetfighters and 2/11 toward the DDG. This tactic 
represents the minimum allocation of offensive salvos that saturates the DDG’s defenses 
50 percent of the time. These values were calculated independently by means of Monte 
Car10 simulation and trial-and-error. Its purpose is not to provide an exact value, but is a 
good approximation for the Turkish allocation of missiles. The U.S. force also faces a 
tactical decision-which Turkish group of ships to target and in what order. The U.S. 
force does not have sufficient capability to concentrate fire and completely destroy any 
single group of Turkish ships in one salvo except the DDs and FFGs. All others require 
at least two exchanges. If the decision is to destroy as many enemy ships as possible, 
then the analysis, shown in Table 8, suggests targeting the DDs and FFG first (because of 
their weak staying power) then concentrate fire on any one of other groups. In this 
exchange, the FPCs are targeted in the second exchange, resulting in a total loss of 16 
Turkish ships. In any decision, both the Streetfighters and DDG are destroyed by the 
second engagement. In this example, there are 2.8 hits against the DDs and 10.4 hits 
against FFGs. These hits are in then distributed equally throughout the entire ship group. 
In the second exchange, the concentrated fire from the Streetfighters and DDG results in 
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9.1 hits against the FPCs. Having expended all 48 defensive missiles in the first 
exchange, the Streetfighters receive 30.55 hits, while the DDG receives 2.57 hits, 
destroying both groups of ships. Note: In the first exchange, the DDG sustains on 
average 0.45 hits, which, by the assumption of the Turkish targeting strategy, is what is 
expected. In any single calculation, there is at least one hit. 
Since it is limited to two Harpoon missiles per salvo, the DDG contributes 
only 5.8 percent (3 of 51) of the total offensive potential of the U.S. force, which is not 
sufficient to independently destroy even the Turkish group of two DDs. If the Turkish 
offensive strategy dedicates less combat power toward the DDG, then the destroyer’s 
strong defensive capabilities allows it to successfully counter the Turkish offensive salvo 
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Table 8. Summary of U.S. Forces vs. 100percent Turkish Force 
























The second case examines a sequence of exchanges between 50 percent of 
the Turkish force engaged against the on-station U.S. force. The aggregated values, 
found in Table 7, are used in the homogeneous equation, with only one change-the total 
number of Turkish ships in this case is 22 instead of 44. Substituting these numbers into 
the equations, the change in the two forces after the first exchange are as follow: 
PB -0.80(a3A) (7 x 3.714)- 0.80(1.477 x 22) 
= 0.00 - AA=  
a1 1.36 
0.80(aA) - b,B 0.80(1.545~ 22) - (3.886~ 7) 
= 0.00 - AB =  
b, 1.14 
42 
Again, the first exchange results in a draw, since each side is capable of defending 
against the other’s offensive salvos. The Turkish offensive (27.2 missiles) is easily 
defeated by the combined U.S. defensive, which is capable of deploying a maximum of 
57.00 missiles (48.858 from the Streetfighters and 8.143 from the DDG). Similarly, the 
U.S. offense (26 missiles) is defeated by the Turkish force, which is capable of deploying 
a maximum of 33.99 missiles (27.2 effective). Note that the Turkish force has little room 
for error without sustaining a hit. As in the first case, the remaining offensive and 
defensive capabilities are calculated independently and used in the homogeneous salvo 
equation to calculate the results of the second exchange. In the next exchange, the 
offensive and defensive potential remaining are 3.364 and 10.341 respectively for the 
Turkish force, and 11.143 and 7.257 respectively for the U.S. force. Since the U.S. 
defensive potential is less than 8.143 (the maximum defensive salvo size), its maximum 
defensive salvo size is now limited to the current inventory level. The Turkish force, on 
the other hand, has the inventory to sustain their maximum rate of fire. The resulting 
calculations are as follows: 
= 0.00 




0.80(aA)-b3B - 0.80(1.545~22)-(3.886~7) 
AB = 
Since both forces are capable of defending against the other’s offensive 
salvos, the second exchange results in a draw. The offensive and defensive potential 
remaining are 1.818 and 8.864 respectively for the Turkish force, and 7.429 and 3.371 
respectively for the U.S. force. The resulting calculations are as follows: 
= 0.00 
j3B-0.80(a3A) - (7~3.714)-0.80(1.477~22) AA= 
a1 1.36 
= 3.15 0.80(~A) -b, B - 0.80(1.545~ 22) - (3.37 IX 7) AB = - 
bl 1.14 
After this exchange, the U.S. force is reduced to only 3.85 of 7 ships, 
while the Turkish Force remains undamaged. The offensive and defensive potential 
remaining are 0.273 and 7.386 respectively for the Turkish force, and 3.714 and 0.000 
43 
respectively for the U.S. force. The U.S. force does not have sufficient defensive 
potential to counter the Turkish offensive, but the Turkish force has just enough defenses 
in each exchange to thwart the U.S. attack. In the fourth exchange, the remaining U.S. 
ships are defeated. 
= 0.00 
PB - 0. 8O(a A) - (3.85 x 3.7 1 4) - 0.8q0.8 1 3x 22) AA= - 
a1 1.36 
= 4.2 
0.8qaA)- b,B - 0.8q0.273~22)- (0~3.85) 
AB = 
bl 1.14 
d) Heterogeneous Analysis: Case 11 
Using the heterogeneous equation, this analysis assumes the Turkish force 
adopts a 3-to-2 offensive tactic, that is 3/5 of the offensive is directed towards the 
Streetfighters and the remainder towards the DDG. It also assumes the Streetfighters 
offensive tactic is to fire 5% of its offensive power against the DD and 35% against the 
FFG, and 60% against the Meko. For ease of writing, a particular unit’s targeting tactic 
will be denoted as follows: (0.05, 0.35, 0.60, 0.00, 0.0). In the second exchange, the 
Streetfighters adopt the following tactic (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.95). In the third 
exchange, the tactic is (0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.65,O.O). The DDG’s tactic in the first exchange is 
(1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0). At first it appears that the U.S. force easily destroys the Turkish 
force, but there are a few items worth noting. First, as in the results from the first 
heterogeneous analysis, the DDG, contributing 3.1 percent (2 of 64.5) of the total combat 
power, is relatively ineffective against any Turkish group that has superior numbers. In 
this instance it is only partially effective against the Turkish destroyer. Second, the only 
way the DDG is able to survive an exchange is if the Turkish force adopted a strategy 
where the Streetfighters is the focus of their combat power, i.e., greater than 60 percent 
combat power, and ignored the DDG. If this happens, the U.S. force would be able to 
defeat the Turkish force in two exchanges without suffering casualties. Third, if the 
DDG is omitted from this analysis or if the Turkish force chooses to concentrate fire on 
the Streetfighters, then the Streetfighters are capable of victory without suffering 
casualties. 
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Table 9. Summary of US. Force vs. 50percent Turkish Force 
e) Homogeneous Analysis: Case III 
This case examines a sequence of exchanges between the U.S. force that is 
on-station and one-third of the Turkish Force. Again, the initial values from Table 7 are 
used as input for the first exchange in the homogeneous model. The results of the first 
salvo is as follows: 
= 5.769 





0.80(aA)- b,B - 0.80(1.545~14.67)-(2.590~7) AB = - 
The second salvo exchange is given by: 
PB -0.80(a3A) (7 x3.714)-0.80(1.545~8.89) 
= 10.99 - AA=  
a, 1.364 
= 0.00 
0.80(aA)- b,B - 0.80(1 S 4 5 ~  8.89)- (1 S72X 7) AB = - 
b, 1.14 
This analysis indicates that the strength and capability of the U.S. force is sufficient to 
overwhelm the Turkish defenses and score enough hits to weaken the force in the first 
salvo exchange, and destroy it in the second exchange. 
J> Heterogeneous Analysis: Case 111 
The heterogeneous case is trivial, since the U.S. force was shown to be 
capable of achieving its objective in the previous case. There are two points worth 
noting, however. First, even at this minimal number of enemy force, the DDG is still 
ineffective against all enemy groups except the DD. Second, the Turkish offensive 
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strategy that defines the threshold for the DDG is almost 1-to-I . This implies that the 
Turkish force would have to allocate approximately 50 percent (9 of 18 salvos) of their 
available combat potential just to successfully destroy the DDG. Since the group of 
Streetfighter, with a defensive salvo capability of 24 in the first salvo, can easily defend 
against the entire Turkish combat potential of 18 missiles. This analysis suggests that the 
best strategy for the Turkish force is to concentrate enough of their first offensive salvo to 
eliminate the DDG, because defensively it is limited to nine SAMs. 
g) Turkish Air Threat 
For clarity in the analysis of the first three cases, the effects of Turkish 
aircraft were ignored. Since the air strike analysis is not needed to show how the details 
of the heterogeneous equations are used, its effects are merely summarized here. In Case 
I, the U.S. force is not capable of surviving the first salvo exchange and so a strike by the 
aircraft is redundant. Case I1 represents the threshold at which the Streetfighters can 
defend against the Turkish offensives and continue to the next exchange. A sufficiently 
large strike by the aircraft weakens the U.S. force so that it is saturated by the Turkish 
surface force’s attack and is destroyed in the first exchange. Only in Case I11 is there 
sufficient slack in the U.S. force’s defense to evaluate the maximum number of aircraft 
that can it can face and still succeed in the mission. From the previous analysis, in the 
best Turkish scenario, the Turkish force has a maximum combat power of 24 missiles, 
while the U.S. force has a defensive power of 33 missiles. This suggests that the U.S. can 
engage an additional nine missiles, or 4.5 aircraft, before saturation. 
In all cases, if the aircraft engage the Streetfighters in sufficient numbers 
before the first exchange of salvos between surface combatants, then the U.S. force is 
overwhelmed by the aircraft and destroyed. U.S. Air Force aircraft cannot attack with 
ASMs but are only useful as CAP to cover the U.S. ships and disrupts the Turkish air 
strikes. 
4. Summary 
This analysis illustrates the differences between the homogeneous and 
heterogeneous salvo models. Where the homogeneous model provides quick and simple 
insight in to the characteristics of salvo warfare, it fails to account for the unique 
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characteristics of platforms and the usefulness of these characteristics. The 
heterogeneous model is capable of capturing these essential details while maintaining the 
relative simplicity of the original salvo model. The heterogeneous model, however, 
entails performance inputs and tactical details, which can quickly grow and must be 
tracked by the modeler. 
As to substance of the results, the illustrative study shows that the U.S. 
force is capable of meeting the campaign objective. Each task group is able to engage up 
to 50 percent of the Turkish naval force and still meet the objectives. However, as the 
Turkish force size increases, so too does the number of U.S. casualties suffered. It has 
been shown that the DDG does not contribute enough combat power to dramatically alter 
the numerical results and, depending on the Turkish strategy, is vulnerable to a large 
Turkish salvo. This result, coupled with the group of Streetfighter’s ability to 
successfully engage the Turkish force without the DDG, suggests an alternate plan. 
Rather than exposing the DDG to unnecessary surface engagements, the DDG should 
remain clear of battle and defend against Turkish air attacks. 
B. STOCHASTIC ANALYSIS USING THE HETEROGENEOUS SALVO 
MODEL 
The simplicity of the salvo equation is both a major benefit as well as a drawback. 
Though the equations may provide quick and easy results, oversimplifying the 
assumptions limits the insights gained. The usefulness of the heterogeneous salvo model, 
by contrast, depends on the targeting data provided for each platform, and also upon the 
parameters used to describe the platform’s effectiveness. We next wish to show how the 
heterogeneous salvo model can be used with stochastic variation of parameters by 
assigning probabilities to key inputs. We desire to capture the essence of the U.S. and 
Turkish force interactions and are less concerned with specific or exact values for 
offensive and defensive effectiveness. To do so requires useful approximations of the 
true values for these two forces. In the absence of empirical data, a distribution from 
which to draw a set of random values to use in the model must be assumed. 
The triangle distribution is a rough but practical surrogate for the true, but 
unknown, distribution of both the offensive and defensive effectiveness parameters in the 
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heterogeneous salvo model. Identifying a feasible interval [a, b], within which it is 
reasonable to believe the value of the true effectiveness parameter lies (with a < b), 
establishes necessary criteria to use this distribution [Ref. 161. An additional value, c, 
which is the mode of the distribution or its most likely value, is required to give shape to 
the distribution. The values of a, b, and c are subjective and must be based upon tests, 
analysis, intelligence, or expert opinion. However, these subjective minimum and 
maximum values are absolute limits and do not allow values outside this range and in 
certain circumstances lead to problems. There are two ways to proceed. First, the 
triangle distribution can use the 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles instead of minimum and 
maximum values. Second, since the triangle distribution is a special form of the beta 
distribution, t h s  general distribution, with the appropriate shape parameters, is used. 
[Ref. 161 Since the salvo equation is based upon many simplifying assumptions, it is not 
necessary to add additional complexity to the problem in order to capture the exact 
distribution. Therefore, this study will use the distribution without concern for the 
minimum and maximum bounds. 
Throughout Sections B.l and B.2 of this chapter, the Turkish offensive and 
defensive effectiveness are assumed distributed triangular with minimum value of 0.5, 
maximum of 0.9, and mode of 0.8. On average, an approximate degradation of 20 
percent in the offensive and defensive power of the Turkish force is expected. However, 
the range of degradation can be between 10 and 50 percent. These values imply that the 
Turkish Navy is highly trained and effective force, but does not have perfect 
effectiveness. 
1. Six Streetfighters vs. 50 Percent Opposition Force 
a)  Analysis Baseline and Purpose 
The previous analysis (Section IV.A.3) demonstrated the heterogeneous 
salvo model’s use in evaluating a potential U.S. tactic and gain insight into an alternative 
tactical approach. Since the DDG is vulnerable to increased levels of Turkish salvos and 
since it does not significantly contribute to the total U.S. combat potential, it should not 
be used to attack the Turkish escorts. If Streetfighters are considered an expendable 
asset, that is, their loss is preferred to the loss of larger warships, then it is desired to 
equip the Streetfighter with the least combat potential necessary to achieve victory in an 
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assigned task. The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate the use of the heterogeneous 
salvo model in a Monte Car10 simulation to evaluate the minimum offensive and 
defensive salvo sizes necessary for one squadron of Streetfighters to successfully engage 
and defeat the Turkish Navy in a surface naval battle. In this way one can infer whether a 
different, smaller capability may be better. A smaller Streetfighter design might then 
allow procurement of a larger Streetfighter force for the same cost. 
In the previous analysis, the analysis indicates that if U.S. intelligence is 
incorrect and the Turkish send more than 50 percent of their naval force against a U.S. 
task group, then the U.S. would fail in its objective. As before, the 36 operational 
Streetfighters are divided into three task groups, with six ships on station in each task 
group. Table 10 provides a summary of a sequence of average exchanges between six 
Streetfighters, alone, facing fifty percent of the Turkish escort force (22 ships). This 
results will serve as a baseline from which to compare later results. They are similar to 
the results in Section IV.A.3.d, but differ in detail because the DDG is removed and 
because the distribution of is concentrated against the Streetfighers. 
Hits Number Hits 









Table 10. Summary of Average Exchanges and Results 
With tactically advantageous targeting (though not mathematically 
optimal ) of the five Turkish groups, the six Streetfighters are able to significantly reduce 
the DD, Perry, and MEKO in the first salvo by expending 25 percent (24 of 96) of their 
offensive potential and 52 percent (25 of 48) of their SAM capability. In the second 
salvo, the Knox FF is the primary target of the Streetfighters, with 70 percent of the 
combat potential being targeted at the FF. The remaining 30 percent is distributed 
equally among the surviving DD and the two FFGs. The FPCs are destroyed in the third 
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salvo after shooting an additional 24 Harpoon missiles and approximately 7 SAMs. On 
average, though, the Streetfighters receive 1.5 147 hits in the third exchange. This results 
when the Turkish force has great success in targeting and defense early, causing the 
Streetfighters to expend many SAMs early in the battle. If the Streetfighters were 
capable of adjusting their mix of weapons loaded prior to leaving port, it would be 
beneficial to know how sensitive this result is to changes in the offensive and defensive 
parameters. 
b)  Monte Carlo Simulations 
By varying the number of Harpoon shots per salvo, one can gain some 
insight into the Harpoon salvo required, with respect to the SAM salvo size, to achieve 
the stated MOE and the number of casualties sustained by the Streetfighters. Table 11 is 
a summary of 1000 Monte Carlo simulations for a fixed SAM salvo size of zero and 
Harpoon salvo sizes varying from five to nine. In other words, the Harpoons must 
destroy the entire Turkish force in the first exchange. The results of the simulation show 
that for salvo sizes less than eight, the average number of Turkish ships that survive the 
battle is greater than one. The reason for such a large offensive salvo is that, as 
mentioned, the Streetfighters do not have sufficient defensive capabilities to counter the 
large Turkish offensive salvo in the first exchange and are, therefore, destroyed before 
expending all their combat potential. It is claimed that if the Streetfighters had no 
defensive capability, then they require an offensive capability of at least eight Harpoons 
per salvo, that is, a lower bound on Harpoon salvo sizes is eight for a SAM salvo size of 
zero. But mission success is tempered by the loss of all six Streetfighters. 
Harpoons/Salvo 9 8 7 6 5 
Average 0.000 0.758 3.894 8.116 13.079 1 I Std ~~~ 
StdErr 0.000 0.023 0.048 0.058 0.065 
z z  Max 0.078 2.960 6.860 11.946 17.046 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.385 3.752 7.703 
Table I I .  Simulation with SAM Fixed at Zero. 
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The opposite extreme was examined using a simulation with the number 
of SAM fixed at eight and a variable Harpoon salvo size. Table 12 is a summary of the 
Monte Carlo simulation for Harpoon salvo sizes from two to six. On average, the 
Turkish escorts survive an engagement with the Streetfighters for offensive salvo sizes 
less than three. The smaller the offensive salvo sizes, the more exchanges are necessary 
to expend sufficient combat power on the enemy force. However, the Streetfighters only 
have a finite supply of defensive weapons and so the Harpoon salvo size must be large 
enough to destroy the enemy before the inventory of SAMs runs out. With an offensive 
salvo size of four (from Table 12) and using tactically optimal targeting, the 
Streetfighters are able to engage and defeat the Turkish ships in three salvo exchanges. 
Not shown in Table 12, separate calculations indicate that the Streetfighter force suffers 
an average of 1.789 hits in the third exchange, resulting in the loss of that same number 
of ships. 
16.564 21.391 
0.000 0.000 0.064 10.020 
able 12. Simulation with SAM Fixed at Eight 
From these two simulations we get results for two extreme points and can 
say that the lower bound on Harpoon salvo size is between four and eight. To try to 
decrease this gap, another simulation was run and the data analyzed. Table 13 is a 
summary of the results from a simulation where the S A M  salvo size is fixed at four and 
the Harpoon salvo size again was varied from five to eight. 
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HarpoonslSalvo 9 8 7 6 
s.5 
5 5, Average 
5 8 StdDev cI 
StdErr 




I i i  .z 3 Average S t d L L l  2.322 2.502 2.765 3.117 
$ 2  StdErr 0.108 0.114 0.122 0.132 
1 1 .ooo 1 1 .ooo 1 1.000 1 1 .ooo 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Table 13. Simulation with SAM Fixed at Four 
0.005 0.010 4.912 16.292 
0.123 0.193 1.953 2.296 
0.004 0.006 0.062 0.073 
3.829 5.502 12.071 20.760 
0.000 0.000 0.685 10.103 
It is observed that for all intermediate values, the Streetfighters are 
incapable of successfully completing the objective. These configurations appear to 
posses the unfavorable characteristics of the first two cases. First, the Streetfighters are 
unable to counter the initial Turkish offensive because they lack sufficient defenses and 
are destroyed before delivering enough salvos against the Turkish force. Second, the 
Streetfighters do not have enough defensive capability to survive a Turkish salvo. Taking 
a risk tolerant targeting strategy, it is possible to reduce the total Turkish force to less 
than one ship with a Harpoon salvo size of six and a SAM size of four 64 percent of the 
time with an average of 3.60 Streetfighters remaining. However, 36 percent of the time 
the average number of Turkish ships surviving is 5.367 and zero Streetfighters remaining. 
Table 14 shows that for a little larger SAM salvo of five, the Streetfighters need a 
Harpoon salvo size of five to complete the mission. 
c) Summary 
The large size of the Turkish escort force (22 ships vs. six Streetfighters) 
dictates the need for the Streetfighter’s configuration to either allow a sufficiently large 
Harpoon salvo size or large defense to achieve victory. By examining Figure 3, the 
minimum Harpoon salvo size required to destroy the Turkish force given a known SAM 
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salvo size is determined. The opposite is also easily determined. Given a fixed Harpoon 
capability, the minimum SAM capabilities needed to accomplish the mission is 
determined. The analysis also suggests a risk tolerant strategy, resulting in large payoffs, 
is possible given an optimal targeting strategy. 
Range of Harpoons/Salvo to Defeat 50% of Turkish Fleet 
e 8 '  x 71 I 
I 
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Figure 3. Required Harpoon-to- SAM Salvo Sizes Against 50% Opposing Fleet 
2. Six Streetfighters vs. 33 Percent Opposition Force 
a)  Baseline Analysis 
The U.S. Concept of Operations stated that the Turkish invasion force is 
equally divided in three naval regions along the western coast of Turkey. It also states 
that the Streetfighters task group will immediately engage the invasion forces after they 
leave port, preventing them from joining together to form one large force. Table 15 is a 
summary of the exchanges between one-third of the Turkish Navy and the Streetfighters 
with standard configuration (four Harpoodsalvo and eight SMsalvo) .  Selecting an 
appropriate targeting plan, the Streetfighters are easily capable of defeating three of the 
five Turk groups, expending 21 Harpoons and 17 SAMs in the first salvo. All six 
Streetfighters survive the second salvo, expending 24 Harpoons and eight SAMs against 










b) Monte Carlo Simulation 
Again, the objective is to determine the minimum salvo capabilities 
necessary for the Streetfighters to successfully complete the mission objective. The first 
simulation fixes the SAM salvo size at zero missiles and varies the Harpoon salvo size. 
Since there are no defenses, the Streetfighters must have sufficient combat potential to 
destroy the Turkish force in the first exchange. From Table 16, the Streetfighters require 
a minimum Harpoon salvo size of seven in order to meet the U.S. objectives. 
Hits Received Number Hits Received Number 
(First Salvo) Remaining (Second Salvo) End 
1.42 0 0 0 
3.05 0 0 0 
0 2.667 8.07 0 
0 2.667 8.07 0 
8.29 0 0 0 
0 6 0 6 
3 3 Average 
3 StdDev 
StdErr 
z sg Max 
Min 
w 
From the baseline calculation, for an available SAM salvo size of eight, 
the Streetfighters need at most a Harpoon salvo capability of four to defeat the Turkish 
force. Further analysis shows that the offensive salvo size can be as small as two missiles 
when the Streetfighters use a (0.15, 0.0, 0.85, 0.0, O.O), (0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.00, l.O), (0.0, 0.0, 
0.0, 1.0, O.O), (0.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0) strategy in the first, second, third, and fourth 
engagements, respectively. It isconcluded that, for this battle, the required Harpoon salvo 
size is between two and seven missiles per salvo. 
0.001 0.648 3.978 8.586 12.619 
0.010 0.575 1.449 1.413 1.066 
0.000 0.018 0.046 0.045 0.034 
0.131 2.148 6.828 11.037 14.352 
0.000 0.000 0.679 4.760 9.440 
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Table 17. Summary of Exchanges Against 1/3 of Turkish Force 
And SAM Salvo S&e of Three Missiles 
For a SAM salvo size of three, the Streetfighters are capable of defending 
themselves through three salvos and completely destroying the Turkish force by the 
fourth exchange with a Harpoon salvo size of two. For SAM sizes less than three, the 
corresponding Harpoon size increases dramatically. 
c) Summary 
From the simulations, it is concluded that to minimize the Harpoon salvo 
size while still achieving the mission objective requires a defensive salvo size capable of 
allowing the Streetfighters to remain in the engagement. If the U.S. force battles 33 
percent of the Turkish force, then the minimum configuration necessary is a defensive 
capability of three or more per salvo and an offensive salvo size of two. Figure 4 
graphical depicts the range of Harpoons salvo sizes necessary to achieve victory given a 
fixed SAM salvo size. The figure indicates that there is less flexibility in the 
Streetfighter’s offensive salvo size compared to that of the defensive salvo size. If there 
is a need to minimize capabilities, say for cost reasons, then reducing the defensive salvo 
size up to the indicated levels will satisfy the mission objective at a risk of increased 
losses to the Streetfighters. 
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I Range of Harpoons/Savlo to Defeat 33% of Turkish Fleet 
I 1  Number of HarpoondSalvo 
Figure 4. Required Harpoons-to-SAM Salvo Sizes Against 33% Opposing Fleet 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
1. Heterogeneous Salvo Model 
From the three scenarios, the analyses demonstrate the use of the heterogeneous 
salvo model in support of decision-making. The homogeneous salvo model provides 
quick insight into the general composition of force design and can be used to assist with 
tactical decisions when forces are relatively equally capable. The U.S. Navy’s vision of 
the future combat environment suggests that it will face threats of various types, with 
different capabilities. The heterogeneous salvo model captures these characteristics to 
calculate the results of a salvo exchange. The three scenarios presented here demonstrate 
the usefulness of the model and illuminates the differences between the homogeneous 
and heterogeneous salvo models. 
2. 
In this analysis the possible deployment of U.S. forces and the tactical use of 
those forces are examined. Approaching the problem from a risk-averse viewpoint, the 
scenarios examine the problem by exploring the threshold of mission failure. With full 
postulated Streetfighter capabilities, the examination indicated that the engaged U.S. 
force (six Streetfighters) is capable of meeting the mission objectives when it engages a 
maximum of 50 percent of the Turkish Force. In all scenarios, only a fraction of the U.S. 
force engages in combat; the remainder serve as reserves and could be used tactically to 
augment the force where needed. The analysis shows that when larger U.S. warships 
U.S. Force Design and Weapons Mix 
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engage in combat, they are easily overwhelmed and destroyed when the enemy has 
superior numbers. In this situation, these ships would serve better in their primary 
mission areas, providing air and submarine support for the Streetfighters. By examining 
the minimum required weapons load that ensures mission success, the analysis 
demonstrates the flexibility of the heterogeneous salvo model to explore tactical 
decisions. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Joint Vision 2020 and Forward ... From the Sea, The Navy Operational Concept 
offer Navy leaders insight into where and how potential military threats will manifest 
themselves and how U.S. military forces must work collaboratively (“jointly”) to fight 
against these threats. As technological advances emerge, the U.S. Navy must seize those 
capabilities that will continue to propel its forces ahead of those of potential adversaries. 
These advances cannot be limited to technologies, but must be a part of a system of 
innovations. Such systems include, but are not limited to, doctrine, tactics, logistics, and 
training. Military and civilian leaders will constantly require analysis of these new 
capabilities, supported by analytical and simulation models. With the emergence of these 
advances, analysts will require either newly developed models to test these advances, or 
old models capable of keeping up with the changes. This thesis has demonstrated that in 
the arena of salvo warfare, the heterogeneous salvo model is flexible enough to give the 
analysts broad insight into the characteristics of the naval forces. 
A. AN ANALYTICAL MODEL AND ITS APPLICATION FOR THE NAVY 
AFTER NEXT 
The Navy Warfare Development Command and the Strategic Studies Group are 
leading the U S .  Navy’s efforts to chart its path. The Capabilities for the Navy After 
Next (CNAN) project is an attempt by the U.S. Navy to examine those leading 
technologies, capabilities, and doctrine that best contribute to future naval forces. A 
concept under examination is network-centric operations (NCO), which shifts operational 
focus from platform to the network in which they operate. The Navy After Next will 
consist of multiple types of platforms, sensors, and weapons, networked together to 
operate efficiently, effectively and adaptively. The power of these network-centric forces 
comes from the timely exchange of information between units within the network. 
If the Navy After Next is to be a force founded upon the principles of network- 
centric operations, then the U.S. Navy will need to pursue innovative methods to 
coordinate, operate and sustain joint forces. Analysts will be required to examine future 
systems, problems, or operational methods. These analysts will need methodologies and 
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models that are flexible enough to keep up with the dynamically changing warfare 
environment . 
The heterogeneous salvo model, an extension of the Hughes Salvo Model, is a 
flexible and robust analytical combat model to show networking advantages. The 
model’s strength lies in its ability to mathematically capture the interaction of a 
heterogeneous force, engaged in salvo warfare against an opposing force, at the 
individual unit level. By encapsulating the unique characteristics of all units, the 
heterogeneous salvo model gives the analyst the capability to exploit unique combat 
characteristics and determine their potential contributions to the force. The model’s 
potential as a tactical or planning tool was demonstrated in the analysis of three 
hypothetical scenarios. Unlike the alternatives, the heterogeneous salvo model allows 
broad yet simple analysis to improve the tactical distribution of combat power. It allows 
a force’s combat potential to be allocated advantageously among many targets for any 
salvo. 
Though developed to analyze salvo attrition, this thesis has also demonstrated that 
the heterogeneous salvo model is flexible enough to model continuous force weaponry, 
such as gun systems. 
There is a cost for using the heterogeneous salvo model. Unlike the homogeneous 
salvo model, which has only a few parameters, the number of parameters used by the 
heterogeneous salvo model grows as the number of unit types increases. For relatively 
small force sizes, the model’s calculations can be done by hand or calculator. 
Spreadsheet analysis, as done in this thesis, can implement moderate sized forces, but 
require a large amount of setup time. This setup time and the subsequent calculations 
may prevent the model from being useful for immediate time critical tactical solutions. 
The heterogeneous salvo model is a combat model with endless applications in 
the Navy After Next. It is an analytical tool to help decision makers and their staffs 
easily understand the complex relationships that exist within and between forces during 
battle. Yet it is easy to understand, program, and apply, given access to inputs. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
While not all-inclusive7 the following list details some recommendations for 
further study to help develop the heterogeneous salvo model for use by naval tacticians: 
The use of graphical user interfaces to support the application of the 
heterogeneous salvo model in high-level computer languages. 
Conduct an analysis of land and air based aircraft units engaging naval forces. 
Compare the tactical use of aircraft currently in inventory against planned 
inventories in support of naval operations. 
Examine the tactical use of “smart” or “next generation” of stand-alone weapons 
in naval tactics. Analyze the introduction of mines, sensors, or other devices, in a 
tactical network of naval platforms as independent units. 
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